

## Corona conspiracy

K Anup Nair<sup>1\*</sup>

### ABSTRACT

Biological Warfare had always been a potent weapon to cause annihilation on the adversaries. This paper is an attempt to understand why Covid-19 outbreak can be linked to the maleficent intent of China to fit into the boots of US as potential super power both economically and militarily amidst the pandemic. The aim is to understand the pattern in which China had conspired to generate the virus in laboratory and spread the same in majority of the countries (especially US and Europe) which are economically reliant on China. The dubious role of WHO and possible way out to counter China has also been discussed in this paper.

**Keywords:** COVID-19, Biological Warfare, Propaganda vs Conspiracy

*“Life is a sum of all our choices”*

*- Albert Camus*

**A**mbitions have no limits and from the evolution of this very planet till dates each one of us is driven by the thread of ambition which controls our act based on the impinging desires. These desires to achieve something are progressive thought but the extremity of this act may lead to mass destruction. Historical anecdotes are full of this kind of extreme desire/ambition which had caused Catastrophic results.

One of the extreme kind of catastrophic mean to achieve ones supremacy is by using biological weapons and the intention to use biological weapons is recorded in Hittite texts of 1500-1200BC, in which the victims of tularemia were pushed to the enemy land for causing epidemic.<sup>1</sup>

Various types of biological warfare have been used in the course of history specially the biological agent and bio-toxins. Pre 20<sup>th</sup> century, use of biological agents were limited to deliberate contamination of food and water and use of bio-toxins. Whereas post 20<sup>th</sup> century, other than toxins, bacterial and viral means were used as bio-agents. There are series of historical anecdotes than amplifies the use of biological means to cause destruction on the enemy. Poisoned spears and arrows were used in the legendary Trojan war whereas water supply of Kirrha<sup>2</sup> was poisoned by Amphictyonic league in the first sacred war of Greece in 590BC.

<sup>1</sup>Education Officer, IA, Bangalore, Karnataka, India

<sup>\*</sup>[Responding Author](#)

**Received: June 01, 2020; Revision Received: June 20, 2020; Accepted: June 25, 2020**

### ***Modus Operandi of Biological Warfare***

The most common aim to use biological warfare is based on the Strategy of “Kill indiscriminately” with “delayed impact that can be confused with natural disease outbreaks, or rather than kill, incapacitate” as stated by John Parachini, Policy Analyser, RAND Washington office, 2001.<sup>3</sup> Being covert, biological warfare is appealing as it causes considerable damage at the economic, Societal and physical level without indulging into full fledged conflict. The justification of the use of Biological warfare is linked to the occurrence of disease in the religious texts.<sup>4</sup> The choice of biological warfare agents depend on the economic, technical and financial capabilities of the state or organisation.<sup>5</sup> Further, the effectiveness of the bio terror attack depends upon the mean by which it can be spread i.e. inhalation, ingestion or cutaneous contact. It is not buying and developing biological agents that matters but other important criteria’s “make infectious disease more suitable and powerful as a mean of biological terrorism” (HCSS, 2016).

### ***Biological Weapon : Ease of use and area of concern***

With cheaper raw material, required technology and scientific advancements, it is easier to prepare these agents using simple lab techniques. In recent years, an estimated thirty countries have become capable of sequencing and synthesising genes of 1000 base pairs or larger.<sup>6</sup> With easier accessibility of bio agents, these are the growing risk that bioweapons can be obtained, easily improvised and used by non-state actors. New allegations have surfaced that tens of billions of dollars are being invested into bio weapons laboratories.<sup>7</sup>

Also, the policy related to storage of infectious diseases needs to be revisited by the policy makers (i.e. variola virus (smallpox) is stored in two WHO repertoires: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, US (CDC), and the State Research Centre of Virology and Biotechnology, Novosibirsk, Russian Federation (VECTOR)<sup>8</sup>, as these biological agents could deliberately or accidentally cause disaster. Another challenge related to handling biological weapons is the risk of laboratory escape. As per CDC reports 400 mishaps<sup>9</sup> in US laboratories with 196 accidental releases out of which 77 reported spills and 46 accidental needle sticks were reported between 2003 to 2009.<sup>10</sup> Also, little control of government over Biotechnological innovation causes large private actors in this field.

There is always a tension between the freedom of scientific research that is based on correct understanding to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other planets, animals, the environment, material, or national security [Labeled as dual use research of concern (DURC)] and governments national security agenda.<sup>12</sup>

Another area of concern is of maintaining extensive and badly inventoried pathogens that can proliferate and cause mass pandemic. In addition, the agents used in biological weapons are microscopic, easily mutable and difficult to detect or trace.<sup>13</sup>

### ***COVID-19 and its features***

SARS-CoV-2 is the seventh corona virus to infect human beings apart from the SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV that causes severe diseases, whereas HKU1, NL63, OC43 and 229E are associated with mild symptoms.<sup>14</sup> SARS-CoV-2 appears to be optimised for binding to the human receptor ACE2; and the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 has a functional polybasic (furin) coverage site at the S1-S2 boundary through the insertion of 12 nucleotides<sup>15</sup> which additionally led to the predicted acquisition of three O-linked glycans around the site.<sup>16</sup> On

## Corona conspiracy

the basis of structural and biochemical studies, it seems that SARS-CoV-2 have an EBD that binds with high affinity to ACE 2 from humans, ferrets, cats and other species with high receptor homology.<sup>17</sup>

In addition, efficient cleavage of the MERS-CoV spike enables MERS-like Corona viruses from bats to infect human cell.<sup>18</sup> The function of the predicted O-linked glycans is unclear, but they could create a ‘mucin-like domain’ that shields epitopes or key residues on the SARS-CoV-2 spike proteins. Several viruses utilise mucin-like domains as glycans that shields involved immunoevasion.<sup>19</sup>

### ***Theories of SARS-COV-2 Origin and possible laboratory Escape***

There are possibly two scenarios that can explain the origin of SARS-CoV-2

***Natural selection in an animal host before zoonotic transfer*** which explains that the COVID-19 may be linked in an animal source that was present in the Huanan Market in Wuhan. The likelihood that bats serve as reservoir hosts for its progenitor is linked to the similarity of SARS-CoV-2 to bat SARS-CoV like corona viruses. Although RaTG13, sampled from a *Rhinolophus affinis* bat<sup>20</sup> is 96% identical to SARS-CoV-2, however its spike diverges in the RBD suggesting that it may not bind efficiently to human ACE2<sup>21</sup>. Even Malayan Pangolins illegally smuggled to Guangdong province contains corona virus similar to SARS CoV-2<sup>22</sup> and same corona virus contained by these pangolins exhibits strong similarity to SARS-CoV-2 in the RBD, including all six key RBD residue.<sup>22</sup> As a prerequisite for a virus to acquire polybasic cleavage site and mutation in the spike protein suitable for bindings to human ACE2, there is a requirement of an animal host having high density of population and an ACE2 encoding gene that is same to human ortholog.<sup>16</sup>

***Natural solution in humans following zoonotic transfer*** which explains that the progenitors of SARS-CoV-2 jumped into humans and acquired the genomic feature through adaptation during human to human transmission. Once the infection acquired, these adaptations causes pandemic to take off producing a large number of cases to trigger the surveillance system that detected it.<sup>20,23</sup>

***Solution during passage theory*** explains that SARS-CoV-2 acquired RBD mutation during adaptation to passage in cell culture, as has been observed in studies of SARS-CoV<sup>12</sup>. The finding of SARS-CoV like corona viruses from pangolin with nearly identical RBDs, however, provides a much stronger explanation of how SARS-CoV-2 acquired these via-recombination or mutation.<sup>24</sup>


As it is evident from the study on the SARS-CoV-2 that bat-derived corona viruses are studied in labs around the world and sufficient evidence is there which states that the virus that causes SARS escaped from the lab itself. French virologist and medicine Nobel Laureate Luc Montagnier has made explosive revelations regarding the origin of the corona virus in a Laboratory in China’s Wuhan. Montagnier alleged the presence of elements of HIV and genus of malaria in the genome of corona virus to be “highly suspectable” and it “could not have arisen naturally”. He also alleged an “industrial accident” to have taken place in the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory, which specialises in corona virus since the 2000s.<sup>25</sup>

## Corona conspiracy


### ***Pattern of Infection***

The study of the initial epidemic emerging from Wuhan till 14 Mar 2020 had infected a total of 49 countries/regions. These 49 countries are basically classified into 5 groups. One group comprised of mostly European countries together with US, Canada and Australia, second group of mainland China, third group of UAE, Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore, fourth group of Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Bahrain, India, Vietnam and Kuwait and lastly Finland, Philippines, Indonesia, Estonia and Qatar(Fig-1).<sup>26</sup>


Out of these five groups, there were only a few of the countries that had shown a sudden jump in confirmed cases that included the US, Germany, Iran, UK, Spain and Italy. It is pertinent to understand that in a span of two to three months only few of the places in China other than Wuhan(Fig-2)<sup>27</sup> had seen major outbreak whereas US, Germany, Iran, UK, Spain and Italy (Fig-3)<sup>26</sup> had maximum number of infected people other than China. To understand this pattern of infection we need to understand the mutual connection between China and these countries.



**Fig-1**



**Fig-2**



**Fig-3**


### ***China and US***

China is the second-largest foreign holder of the US treasury and as of February 2020, it owned \$1.09 trillion in Treasury, more than 15% of the public debt held by foreign countries. US debt to China is high (however not as record high of %1.7 trillion in 2011)<sup>28</sup> China buys US debt to support the value of the dollar to peg its currency Yuan against dollar. China devalues the currency as and when it needs to keep its export prices

## Corona conspiracy

competitive. Also China has its role in being American's largest bankers and threatens to sell the holdings whenever the US pressures it to raise the Yuan's value.<sup>29</sup>

China is the third largest exporter with shipping worth of \$479.5 billion worth of goods to the US contributing \$419 billion trade deficit for the US.<sup>30</sup> China has become an integral part of the global manufacturing supply chain as its export comprises of foreign-produced components delivered for final assembly in China. Chinese manufacturing also lowered prices in the US for consumer goods, decreasing inflation and putting more money in US wallets. The economic benefits generated from US investment in China and Chinese investment in US if combined, contributes to a total of 2.6 million US jobs and about \$216 billion of GDP (Fig-4).<sup>31</sup>



**Fig-4**

### ***China and Italy***

Since the early 2000s, trade between the two countries has increased fivefold (from \$9.6 billion in 2001 to \$49.9 billion in 2019). The trade deficit for Italy has been continuously increasing, reaching \$20.9 billion in 2019, whereas Italian import to China has declined, dropping to 61% in 2019. In 2019, China was the third largest import partner of Italy (more than 7% of its import) and 9<sup>th</sup> biggest export partner (just 2.9% of Italian exports) mainly in electronic equipment and machinery.<sup>32</sup>

China's FDI in Italy reached \$17.4 billion since 2000, with the peak of investment in 2014 and 2015. The investment and construction contracts of China in Italy if considered including loans, the amount of investment reaches \$ 25.5 billion [energy (\$6.5 billion), transport (\$8.75 billion), technology (\$4 billion) and finance (\$2.8 billion)]. Chinese company ChemChina has acquired 17% of Pirelli, the world's largest tyre-maker for \$7.9 billion. People's Bank of China has purchased shares worth more than \$4 billion in Intesa Sanpaolo, Unicredit, Eni, Enel, Telecom Italia, Generali, Terna and others.<sup>31</sup> In Mar 2019, Italy being the largest economy in Europe (15% of Eurozone GDP) became the official member of the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) and the first G-7 country to join the Beijing led platform as a major boost for Chinese ambition in Europe.<sup>33</sup>

### ***China and Spain***

Spain's relationship with China dates back to 1973 and in the midst of the 2008-2010 financial and economic crises, China purchased large amounts of Spanish debt (12%)<sup>34</sup> and became the second-largest international creditor. Trade with China represented 73% of the total Spanish trade deficit but just over 2% of Spain's exports and only 4.7% of China's trade surplus in 2017. However, by 2018 these figures had risen to 26.9 billion Euros compared to 6.2 billion excess of exports in 2017.<sup>35</sup>

## Corona conspiracy

China's COSCO (China Oceans Shipping Company, Hong Kong) has acquired 51% of the container ports of Bilbao and Valencia and further expressed interest in similar acquisitions in the ports of Barcelona.<sup>36</sup> The state owned China three Gorges Corporation had already acquired a major stake in Energias de Portugal, which is closely interlinked with the electricity and gas market in Spain and the Madrilena Red de Gas, Madrid's gas network.<sup>37</sup> Telefonica and other telecom companies of Spain depend on Huawei for their operations in Spain and America, which is becoming a region of cooperation and competition between Spain and China. With China's interest in Latin America, Spain turns out to be a perfect partner for its exploitation.<sup>38</sup> Chinese tourism to Spain is growing exponentially with an addition of 20000 Chinese immigrants in the country.<sup>39</sup>


### China and Germany

Germany has profited from the export of the automotive sector and mechanical engineering in China and in turn China has become an important export market and supplies for Germany. Germany's trade with China increased 35% in 2017 totaling to \$230bn<sup>40</sup> and further increased in 2018. German auto sector directly employs 8,30,000<sup>40</sup> people in China and supports a further 2 million in the wider economy. German brands produced 1/4th of the vehicles sold in the PRC. German carmakers are becoming more reliant on the PRC due to China's strong position in battery technology. Chinese FDI into Germany has reached an all time high of almost \$13 billion.


The Chinese strategy of investing is only a primary motive to siphon-off valuable know-how and expertise, of the German manufacturing units. In the small town of Arnstadt, the Chinese investor's with an investment of \$2 billion are planning to build a factory to produce batteries for electric cars. Similarity, China is planning a large investment in the city of Duisburg, the world's largest inland port.<sup>41</sup>

Germany is the largest European investor in technology business operating in China and Chinese businesses also invested over \$2.95 billion in Germany in 2016. In 2016, only Germany had started more than 300 projects in China worth \$2.71 billion. China has a huge domestic market, established manufacturing ecosystem, sufficient capital, a large skilled labour force and relatively low R&D costs for the German Investors. 30% of German Companies operating in China are already involved in or are considering their participation in BRI. Most German Investments in the BRI is in the automotive and construction sectors, making 40% of total investments.<sup>40</sup>

Composition of German Imports from China (2016)



Industry Focus of German Businesses



Source: German Chamber of Commerce

Graphic© Asia Briefing Ltd

### *China and Iran*

Apart from helping in military modernisation, nuclear proliferation programme and shielding from international sanctions, China is Iran's bigger economic partner due to Iran's abundant energy resources and China's growing energy needs. Iran has formed a joint oil and gas committee with China to broaden and expedite Energy Corporation. Beijing sees Iran as prime real estate in western Asia with first rate natural resources, plenty of human capital and relatively trapped market.

The two states agreed to expand trade to \$600 Billion over a period of 10 years from 2016 onwards with a stronger corporation as part of 25 year plan. About 100 major Chinese companies invested in Iran's Key economic sectors, especially energy and transportation. China National Nuclear Corporation is redesigning Iran's Arak IR-40 heavy water reactor to address non proliferation as part of 2015 Iran Nuclear deal.<sup>42</sup>

The Chinese government has extended a \$10 billion loan to Chinese companies to build dams, power generators, and other infrastructure in Iran (rail Link between Bayannur in China's Inner Mongolia region to Tehran and to Mashhad and Bushehr). Chinese involvement in construction of ports in Chabahar in the Gulf of Oman is another project that was initially cooperated with India. Tehran's five metro lines as well as railcars are built by Iranian Chinese joint venture enterprise, Tehran Wagon manufacturing company.<sup>41</sup> Chinese energy corporations have become important developers of oil and natural gas fields in Iran. China is reengaged in three key energy projects in Iran: the South Pars gas field, the Yadavaran oil field and development of the Jask Oil terminal.<sup>42</sup>

### *China and UK*

UK- China trade had grown quickly over the past two decades with an eight fold increase of UK export to China over the period 1999-2015 and 10 fold increase in UK import from China over the same period (ONS, 2016). Chinese economy being the UK's fourth largest source of imported goods generated a significant trade surplus in China's favour (ONS, 2018).

In the first decade of this century, EU FDI flows to China grew rapidly with a stagnation which rather failed to recover, declining to 23% during 2016. Meanwhile, Chinese FDI into the EU accelerated sharply to reach ERU 35 billion in 2016 an increase of 77% over the previous year (Hermann et al. 2019). China's relations with the UK like other major economic partner's lies in the reason to build bilateral structures within the FTA that stabilises and promotes economic growth to reinforce CCP legitimacy (Naughten, 2016).

China's bilateral economic agreements have shifted from tariff reduction to importing to one overriding condition to recognise China as a market economy. China's Shaanxi Ligeance Mineral Resources acquired Derby based Gardner Aerospace for GBP326 million, to develop capabilities in advanced aero-engine manufacturing to match those of Airbus and Boeing (Aviation Week Network, 2017). China is involved in using China's Hualong one reactor technology in the upgrade of energy facilities at Bradwell (World Nuclear News, 2017). Major railway building projects such as HS2 include Chinese enterprises among the projects train operation and fulfillment partners.<sup>43</sup>

China is promoting its currency, renminbi (RMB) as an alternative store of international monetary value to the US Dollar and Euro. London remains a key partner of this strategy (Leung, 2016; Liu and Li, 2016). All these figures bring out the bigger aim of China to

## Corona conspiracy

invest heavy in different continents and to validate its presence. Also, the ultimate aim is to slowly capture the existing markets of these countries leading to financial imperialism and economic servitude. The initial spread of COVID-19 pandemic in the above mentioned countries is attributed mainly to the Chinese presence with a bigger aim to capture the crest fallen markets of these nations amidst the economic slowdown.

### ***China's opportunism amidst COVID outbreak***

A pandemic is a cause of concern for all and the first reaction of any nation is to contain the outbreak with an aim to find a feasible solution to save its citizens followed by an impetus on economic growth. However, China had something dubious in its dealings. China found the outbreak not only as a persistent opportunity to overwhelm the world market but also to fecundate its endeavour to exercise its military supremacy.

Chinese ships and aircrafts have been seen venturing across China's maritime periphery and disputed boundaries that include China's primary regional rivals – Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan and India. In mid-March, in an exercise intended to intimate Taiwan, PLA aircrafts crossed the median lines in the Taiwan Strait.<sup>44</sup> In late March, a Chinese fishing vessel collided with Japanese destroyer in the East China Sea.<sup>45</sup> In South China sea, several incidents involving Chinese vessels have been notices especially near Paracel archipelago and Scarborough Shoals, both being disputed areas between China, Vietnam and Philippines. These actions by China in Taiwan Strait, East China Sea and South China Sea demonstrate a continuation of this flexible, opportunistic approach.<sup>46</sup>

China has also used this time to consolidate and expand gains among friendly regional states such as Cambodia and Nepal. Also, regional escalation of dispute with India at Pangong Tso in Eastern Ladakh, Nathula ahead of Muguthang in Sikkim, Ladakh's Galwan valley and Lipulekh Pass (a tri-junction between Nepal-India and China) indicates that China's national aggression is COVID-proof.<sup>47</sup>

Chinese firms are positioned to take advantage of the sharp drop in global company valuation and they will rather invest strategically, mainly focusing on "Soft infrastructure" companies dealing with 5G, AI and Big data. Already Chinese investors have poured \$6 billion into Indian startup companies in the last two years and raised its stake in mortgage lender by Bank of China in HDFC, India's largest bank by over 1%, which is a clear indication that China is taking this opportunity for hostile takeover amidst COVID-19 pandemic. Overall this approach by China is significantly based on the maxim of Vladimir Lenin: "Probe with a bayonet : if you meet steel, stop. If you meet musk, then push."<sup>48</sup>

### ***Dubious Role of WHO***

WHO supported China with the starting of a scheme for global health colonisation and helped them to invest across all the continents. Allegations have been made on the role of WHO Chief Tedros' credentials and the accusation on him of siding with China and politicising the Coronavirus. Further, allegations have been made about China's control over WHO and its role in delaying the data of spread of COVID-19 and allowing Chinese nationals to fly to Milan, New York and other places resulting in spread of virus in the rest of the world. Some argue that WHO may have been worried that challenging China in any way during the pandemic would worsen the crisis by putting it in the defensive. However, the unnecessary and wrong praise on china by WHO to contain the pandemic is a cause of concern.<sup>48</sup>

## Corona conspiracy

China's growing influence over the institution is another area of contention as China's WHO contributions have grown in recent years, rising by 52% since 2014 to approximately \$84 million. China has also increased voluntary contribution from \$8.7 million in 2014 to approximately \$10.2 million in 2019. As per MERIC expert des Garets Geddes "China's potential of becoming a major WHO contributor must necessarily be an alluring prospect for the UN agencies".<sup>48</sup> The cooperation between WHO and China allows Beijing to influence political decisions and build coalitions across the world. Also, critics point to Taiwan's continued exclusion from the WHO as evidence of China's influence in the institution.

## CONCLUSION

Increasing backlash and polarised battle from the international community for an enquiry on the origin of the coronavirus, role of China in its contagion and initial mishandlings of the crisis resulting into the outbreak, has put China on back foot. Where, Germany has demanded for \$160 billion compensation from China for damages to Germany from the virus, US in seeking \$10 million for every American death. While most countries are battling the coronavirus pandemic, China's economic and military aggression indicates that China intentionally developed this virus in the laboratory and purposely mishandled the initial outbreak in Wuhan resulting in widespread infection in other countries as well. It is pertinent to understand that there is a need for an international agenda, coordinated by the rest of the world to counter Chinese assertiveness and opportunism. There is an urgent need from all countries not to tolerate the efforts by China to take advantage of the ongoing pandemic and address this issue accordingly. A robust code of conduct based on established international laws and norms should be enforced to reduce economic dependence on China by expanding bilateral and multilateral trade and investment amongst other countries and adopt Japanese model of inducement to all companies that leave production out of China.

## REFERENCES

1. Mayor A (2003). *Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World*. Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Duckworth. ISBN 978-1-58567-348-3.
2. Mayor, Andrienne (2003), *Greek Fire, Poison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World*, The Overlook Press, Peter Mayer Publishers, Inc., ISBN 1-58567-348-X, pp 100–101
3. RAND, "Assessing the Threat of Biological Terrorism", Statement by John Parachini, Policy Analyst, RAND Washington Office, 2001.
4. Jerrold M., Post. "Differentiating the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Motivations and Constraints" 8, no. 3 (2002): 187–200
5. Riedel S. (2004). Biological warfare and bioterrorism: a historical review. *Proceedings (Baylor University. Medical Center)*, 17(4), 400–406. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08998280.2004.11928002>
6. *Analysis of the Threat of GMO for Biological Warfare.pdf*
7. ISS, *The BWC: Issues for the 2016 Review Conference*, November 11, 2015, <https://www.iiss.org/en/events/eu%20conference/sections/eu-conference-2015-6aba/special-session-1-a350/special-session-7-86f9>
8. [https://hcss.nl/sites/default/files/files/reports/Threat and Care of BWdef4eversie\\_0.pdf](https://hcss.nl/sites/default/files/files/reports/Threat%20and%20Care%20of%20BWdef4eversie_0.pdf)
9. "Report: 395 Mishaps at U.S. Labs Risked Releasing Select Agents," CIDRAP Centre for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, September 28, 2011, accessed August 28, 2016, <http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2011/09/report-395-mishaps-U.S.-labs-risked-releasing-select-agents>.

## Corona conspiracy

10. Stefano Merler et al., "Containing the Accidental Laboratory Escape of Potential Pandemic Influenza Viruses," *BMC Medicine* 11, no. 1 (November 28, 2013): 89. doi:10.1186/s12916-013-0188-1.
11. Martin Furmanski, "Threatened Pandemics and Laboratory Escapes: Self-Fulfilling Prophecies," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 31, 2014, <http://thebulletin.org/threatened-pandemics-and-laboratory-escapes-self-fulfilling-prophecies7016>.
12. United States Government Science, Safety and Security, "United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual use Research of Concern," September 24, 2014.
13. Danzig, Richard, "Proliferation of biological weapons into terrorist hands," in: Scawcroft, B; J. Nye, and K. Campbell (ed) *The Challenge of Proliferation*, Aspen Strategy Group, 2005
14. Corman, V. M., Muth, D., Niemeyer, D. & Drosten, C. *Adv. Virus Res.* **100**, 163–188 (2018).
15. Walls, A. C. et al. *bioRxiv* <https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.02.19.956581> (2020).
16. Andersen, K.G., Rambaut, A., Lipkin, W.I. et al. The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2. *Nat Med* **26**, 450–452 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0820-9>
17. Wan, Y., Shang, J., Graham, R., Baric, R. S. & Li, F. J. *Viol.* <https://doi.org/10.1128/JVI.00127-20> (2020).
18. Menachery, V. D. et al. *J. Virol.* <https://doi.org/10.1128/JVI.01774-19> (2019)
19. Bagdonaite, I. & Wandall, H. H. *Glycobiology* **28**, 443–467 (2018).
20. Zhou, P. et al. *Nature* <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2012-7> (2020).
21. Wan, Y., Shang, J., Graham, R., Baric, R. S. & Li, F. J. *Viol.* <https://doi.org/10.1128/JVI.00127-20> (2020).
22. Zhang, T., Wu, Q. & Zhang, Z. *bioRxiv* <https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.02.19.950253> (2020).
23. Wu, F. et al. *Nature* <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2008-3> (2020).
24. Cui, J., Li, F. & Shi, Z.-L. *Nat. Rev. Microbiol.* **17**, 181–192 (2019).
25. Desk, W. (2020, April 18). Coronavirus man-made in Wuhan lab, says Nobel laureate. Retrieved from <https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2020/04/19/coronavirus-man-made-in-wuhan-lab-says-nobel-laureate.html>
26. Jun. (2020, March 18). Classify Growth Patterns For COVID-19 Data. Retrieved from <https://towardsdatascience.com/classify-growth-patterns-for-covid-19-data-41af4c7adc55>
27. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eclinm.2020.100354>
28. Congressional Research Service. "China's Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implications for the U.S. Economy," Page 2. Accessed April 21, 2020.
29. Congressional Research Service. "China's Currency Policy," Page 1. Accessed April 21, 2020.
30. World Integrated Trade Solution. "China Exports by Country and Region 2018." Accessed April 21, 2020.
31. Understanding the US-China Trade Relationship. (2018, January 26). Retrieved from <https://www.uschina.org/reports/understanding-us-china-trade-relationship>
32. Valbona Zeneli and Michele Capriati for *The Diplomat*. (2020, April 24). Is Italy's Economic Crisis an Opportunity for China? Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/is-italys-economic-crisis-an-opportunity-for-china/>
33. Valbona Zeneli for *The Diplomat*. (2019, April 03). Italy Signs on to Belt and Road Initiative: EU-China Relations at Crossroads? Retrieved from

## Corona conspiracy

- <https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/italy-signs-on-to-belt-and-road-initiative-eu-china-relations-at-crossroads/>
34. Otero-Iglesias, P. M., Otero-Iglesias, M., Acerca del autor Miguel Otero-Iglesias Investigador principal del Real Instituto Elcano y profesor del IE School of Global and Public Affairs. También es investigador asociado en el Instituto para la Unión Europea y Asia en la ESSCA School of Management de Paris. Su principal área de investigación es la economía política internacional en todas sus vertientes. Sus áreas de especialización incluyen la unión monetaria europea y la cooperación monetaria en otras regiones del mundo; las relaciones monetarias y financieras internacionales; la globalización y sus efectos; el triángulo de poder entre la UE, 5:20, J. Z., Juan Carlos Fernández Cela 6/11/2017 | 1:42, & \*, N. (2015, January 12). ¿Cuánta deuda española tiene el gobierno chino? Retrieved from <https://blog.realinstitutoelcano.org/cuanta-deuda-espanola-tiene-el-gobierno-chino/>
  35. ICEX España Exportación e Inversiones, E.P.E, M.P. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://www.icex.es/icex/es/navegacion-principal/todos-nuestros-servicios/informacion-de-mercados/paises/navegacion-principal/el-pais/relaciones-bilaterales/index.html?idPais=CN#4>
  36. Vasca, E. R. (2017, June 12). Una empresa china compra la terminal de contenedores del Puerto de Bilbao. Retrieved from <https://www.eitb.eus/es/noticias/economia/detalle/4899384/cosco-compra-51-terminal-contenedores-puerto-bilbao/>
  37. <https://www.expansion.com/empresas/energia/2016/09/10/57d301ffe2704ee15d8b45a0.html>
  38. <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/8b9d3f12-8dfa-4ad4-aa80-547325bb086a/ARI108-2018-Ortega-Technological-cooperation-Spain-China.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=8b9d3f12-8dfa-4ad4-aa80-547325bb086a>
  39. <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/c877ebd5-6d80-4114-9881-17585dc13d7a/ARI48-2018-Hernandez-Turismo-chino-Espana-opportunidad-nuevas-tendencias.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=c877ebd5-6d80-4114-9881-17585dc13d7a>
  40. China-Germany Relations: Opportunities Emerge as Investment Ties Grow. (2018, April 27). Retrieved from <https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-germany-relations-opportunities-emerge-investment-ties-grow/>
  41. Assistant, C. L., LenzTrainee, C., Lenz, C., Trainee, Assistant, E. S., Soula, E., & Assistant, R. (2020, June 24). Germany's Faustian Bargain on Trade with China. Retrieved from <https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/germanys-faustian-bargain-on-trade-with-china/>
  42. Vatanka, A. (2019, September 05). China's Great Game in Iran. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/05/chinas-great-game-in-iran/>
  43. Irwin Crookes, P., & Farnell, J. (2019). The UK's Strategic Partnership with China beyond Brexit: Economic Opportunities Facing Political Constraints. *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 48(1), 106–121. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1868102619858783>
  44. Chinese military flies night exercises close to Taiwan, island says. (2020, March 17). Retrieved from <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3075526/taipei-says-chinese-military-aircraft-flew-night-exercise>
  45. Al Jazeera. (2020, March 31). Japanese warship, China fishing boat collide in East China Sea. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/japanese-warship-china-fishing-boat-collide-east-china-sea-200331022338472.html>

## Corona conspiracy

46. Same as It Ever Was: China's Pandemic Opportunism on Its Periphery. (2020, April 17). Retrieved from <https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/same-as-it-ever-was-chinas-pandemic-opportunism-on-its-periphery/>
47. Bagchi, I. (2020, May 24). China's aggression at border & Nepal's new maps are not coincidental. Retrieved from <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/chinas-aggression-at-border-nepals-new-maps-are-not-coincidental/articleshow/75922989.cms>
48. (www.dw.com), D. W. (n.d.). What influence does China have over the WHO?: DW: 17.04.2020. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/what-influence-does-china-have-over-the-who/a-53161220>

### ***Acknowledgements***

The author appreciates all those who participated in the study and helped to facilitate the research process.

### ***Conflict of Interest***

The author declared no conflict of interest.

**How to cite this article:** K Anup Nair (2020). Corona conspiracy. *International Journal of Indian Psychology*, 8(2), 1167-1178. DIP:18.01.134/20200802, DOI:10.25215/0802.134